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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
P. MART JOR'GENSEN and
MARIE A. JORGENSEN, his
wife, dba DIMPLE DELL
FLORAL COMPANY,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
HARTFO·RD FIRE INSURANCE
CO:MPANY, a corporation,
Defendant ,and Appellant.

Case No. 9602

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMEN'T OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action by plaintiff upon an insurance policy issued by defendant covering all direct
loss by fire.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court, sitting without a jury, found
that a fire occurred on the premises of the defendant,
and as a direct loss of the fire, plaintiffs suffered
damage in excess of $5,000.00, and judgment was
entered against defendant under the terms of its
policy of insurance with plaintiffs for the sum of
$5,478.38.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment of
the trial ·court's judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties to this action will be referred to
as they appeared in the trial court.
The plaintiffs operate a floral business known
as Dimple Dell Floral where they grow potted
plants, chrysanthemums, poinsettias, azaleas, and
other varietie·s of green plants ( R. 9) .
In connection with that operation they purchased a policy of insurance from the defendant,
identified at trial as Exhibit 1. The policy insured
against:
" . . . ALL DIRECT LOSS BY FIRE,
LIGHTNING AND BY RE'MOVAL FROM
PREMISES ENDANGERED BY THE PERILS INSURED A G A I N S T IN THIS
POLICY ... "
Under paragraph 14 of the policy, the follow.1ng appears :
"Electrical Apparatus: If electrical appliances or devices (including wiring) are
covered under this policy, this company shall
not be liable for any electrical injury or disturbance to the said electrical appliances or
devices (including wiring) caused by electrical currents artificially ge11erated unless
fire ensues, and if fire does ensue, this company shall be liable only for its proportion
of lo'ss caused by such ensuing fire."
2
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The plants and bulbs in the greenhouse were
insured for $5,000.00 under the terms of the policy,
as set forth above.
The plaintiffs' greenhouse is heated by steam
heat and fired by an oil furnace. During the winter
months, the grennhouse night temperature is maintained at approximately 65 degrees ( R. 10) . An
electrical alarm is so constructed that when the
temperature in the greenhouse drops to 53 degrees
Farenhei t, it sounds an alarm in the bedroom of
the plaintiffs, which is approximately 100 feet away
from the greenhouse ( R. 10) . During the evening
of the 12th of December, 1960, and the morning
of the 13th of December, 1960, the alarm sounded.
Mr. Jorgensen immediately went to the greenhouse
and found th·at the furnace was not operating (R.
11).
When Mr. Jorgensen first entered the greenhouse after the alarm sounded, he recognized the
smell of an over-heated motor ( R. 22). He observed
no damage ( R. 23), and saw no smoke ( R. 21).
His attempts to reset the controls and start the
furnace were futile and he immediately called his
neighbor Darrell Maynes, who is an electrician
(R. 11).
Since the temperature in the greenhouse was
falling, the plaintiff burned alcohol an·d fuel in
small stoves which produced sufficient heat (R. 12)
3
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to maintain the temperature in the greenhouse above
freezing for approximately 25 hours while repairs
to the motor and furn~ace were being completed
(R. 12-13). During this time, plaintiff's plants
were damaged. The poinsettas turned blue and lost
their leaves "and everything got covered with
smoke," from the improvised heaters ( R. 13). Exhibit No. 3 is a list of plants allegedly damaged.
Some of the plants were salvaged and sold at a discount (R. 14).
Mr. Maynes discovered that the electric motor
would not operate because it was "electrically burned out" (R. 35). He found some charred insulation
in the area where the copper wire had melted. The
plaintiffs maintained ·a new standby motor which
the electrician installed and it immediately "burned
out" (R. 24, 39). The electric motor which faile!d
served to pump oil into the furnace and also operated
a blower constructed as a part of the furnace ( R.
26).
The plaintiffs' electrician explained that the
excessive heat in a motor is caused "by electrical
disturbances of some sort or another" ( R. 40). He
testified: "if the motor stops ·and the electrical current remains attached, that will cause it; another,
there are two sets of windings in there. One is designed to carry a heavy current for a short period
of time, but if it remains in or falls back into contact, that will do it" (R. 41).
4
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Mr. Maynes originally installed the motor protection and control units, in connection with the
operation of the furnace. They consisted of a magnetic switch with thermo-over-load protection units
anld m·an ual switch operations ( R. 42) . After the
second motor "burned out" the entire motor and a
part of the furnace, were removed for repair ( R. 45).
Mr. Eugene Hadley, an electrician employed by
the C. W. Silver Company, was ·also called to J orgensen's place of business during the early hours of
December 13, 1960. When he arrived, he examined
the motor and found it was '"blowed" ( R. 47). He
explained this term by saying: ''In the process the
wires in the motor melted and the circuits broke."
Since the melting point of copper is 1981 degrees
Farenheit (R. 48), he gave as his opinion that
when the copper wiring was in the process of melting it would prdduce a "glow" ( R. 48). He explained
that the melting of the wire circuits in the motor
took place after the motor had stopped ( R. 49). He
described the "glow" as the "same glow as in a light
globe produced from the flow of electricity through
a wire." On cross examination this witness testified:
"Q. Did you find what caused this motor to burn?
A. It was a bad bearing deep in the
rotor shaft.
Q. It was a mechanical defect tha;t was
in the motor that caused it to electrically burn
out?
5
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A. That is right. ( R. 50) "
Upon examination of the motor he found that
the bearings had been severely worn.

Q. What causes those to wear, do you
know?
A. Every day use, metal, weak metal.
Q. Every day wear and tear? Do you
know what happened to the second motor?
A. Well, it was just burned, electrically
burned is all I know. ( R. 5'1)
He also gave as his opinion, that the same
worn bearings which caused the first motor to stop,
also caused the stoppage of the second motor (R.
52). Hi's further examination revealed ·a bent shaft
in the furnace mechanism which, he indicated, would
not permit the motor to run true and caused an
electrical overload.
The defendant called Mr. David Lyon, an electrical engineer, who qu·alified as an expert in his
profession. He in·dicated that when electrical energy
is applied to a motor, and it cannot be dissipated
in form of magnetic energy, th·at it manifests itself
as heat. "'The insulation become·s charred, and the
windings eventually short circuit and melt together"
( R. 58) . He further testified tha:t a defective bearing, or ·any other load connected to a motor which
restricts the rotation of the motor, heats it ·and slows
it down. As a result:
6
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"The motor is going to become overloaded
and the speed will fall below its normal, which
in this case was 3,450 R.P.M. T'he speed falls
below normal, and therefore the motor begins
to consume or use or draw in as you m·ay
choose to look at it, magnetic current. And
since current is energy, the energy has to be
dissipated in some form, and as the motor is
turning slower and slower and therefore accomplishing less work, the energy manifests
itself in the form of heat." (R. 58)
The heat which is not dissipated causes a rise
in temperature and "cooks or fuses and blows the
n1otor, and the motor becomes internally short-circuited and burned out ... The associated heat in an
electrical motor failure follows the mechanical malfunction," (R. 59).
No testimony was offered by plaintiffs to show
what portion of the claimed damage to the electric
n1otors was a result of any alleged fire, and which
portion was a result of "electrical injury or disturbance.''
The trial court, sitting without a jury, awarded
plaintiffs judgment in the sum of $5,478.38, which
included $190.20 damage to the furnace and the
motors ( R. 64-66) . The policy limited recovery to
$5,0000 (Exhibit 1).
Motions for New Trial, and to Amend Findings
of Fact, and Judgment were denied November 21,
1961.
7
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
P·OINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
A FIRE OCCURRED ON PLAINTIF\FS' PREMISES
WITHIN THE CONTE MPLATION OF THE INSURANCE ·POLICY, WHERE BY DEFENDANT AGREED
TO INDE:MNIFY PLAINTIFFS AGAINST ALL 'D'IRECT
LOSS BY FIRE.
1

1

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE PLAINTIFFS' DAMAGE WAS A DIRECT AND
PROXIMATE RESULT OF THE A'LLEGED FIRE.
POINT III.
RECOVERY FOR DAMAGE RESULTING FR·OM
AN ELECITRI·CAL INJ·URY OR DISTURBANCE IS SPECIFICXLLY EXCUUDED UNDE·R THE TERMS OF THE
POLICY.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING
PLAINTIFF AN AMOUNT IN EXCESS OF THE POLICY
LIMITS.

ARGUMENT
POI'NT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
A FIRE OCCURRED ON PLAINTIFFS' PREMISES
WITH'IN THE CONTEMPLATION OF T'HE INSURAN·CE POLICY, WHEREIBY DEFENDANT AGREED
TO INDEMNIFY PLAINTIFFS AGAINST A·LL D'IRECT
LOSS BY FIRE.
1

·under the terms of the insurance policy the
defendant insured certain of the plaintiffs' property
against ". . . all direct loss by fire . . . " 'The inter8
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pretation of this phase presents the principal issues
of this appeal. Black's Law Dictionary, Third Edition, p. 783, defines fire as:
"The effect of combustion. The juridical
meaning of the word does not differ from the
vernacular." Lavitt v. Hartford County Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 105 Conn. 729, 136
A. 5'27.
The cases 'have ·consistently held that the term
"fire" as used in insurance policies is to be given
its ordinary and common meaning and not its scientific and technical meaning. Pacific Fire Insurance Company vs. C. C. Anderson Company, 45 Fed.
Supp. 90 (Idaho), Sculley vs. Brenner County Farmers M~ttual Insurance Ass'n., 245 N.W. 280 (Iowa),
lr orse vs. The Jersey Plate Glass Ins~tr~ance Company, 93 N.W. 569 (N.J.)
The definition of ''fire" as contained in the
case of L~avitt v. Hartford County Mrzttual Fire Insurance Co., 105 Conn. 729, 136 A. 527, ·has been
widely accepted by both authors of textual materials
and legal opinions alike. The Court there stated:
"The word 'fire', in insuran'ce, does not
have the technical meaning which is developed
from a scientific analysis of its nature and
properties, but more clearly that which conforms to the popular understanding of the
word. It is rather an effect, than an elementary principle; it is the effect of combustion,
and is equivalent to ignition or burning; yet
heat is not 'fire'." (Emphasis added).
9
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The annotator in 45 C.J.C., Insurance, Section
809, page 861 states:
"As a general rule, to constitute a 'direct
loss or damage by fire', within the usual
terms of a policy, there must be an actual fire
in the proper sense of that term, from which
the los's or damage results ... "
In the case of Western Woolen Mill Company
vs. Northern Assurance Company of London, 139
Fed. 637 (8th Cir., 1905), a quantity of wool owned
by plaintiff was insured against direct loss by fire.
During a flood the wool became submerged in water.
Followin·g the flooding there was evidence that the
strings which held the fleeces together had been
burned and the rooms where the wool was located
were filled with smoke and an odor of burnt wool.
A witness testified the wool was so hot it could not
be handled by hand and there was also some evidence of the existence of ashes. Another testified
that the wool was ·charred. The trial court sustained
a demurrer to the evidence and judgment was entered for the defendant. The trial court's finding
that there was no fire within the meaning of the
policy was affirmed. The following language, pertinent to our present inquiry, is borrowed from that
. .
opinion:
"In their interpretation we n1ust give to
the words employed therein their ordinary and
proper significan·ce, unless it appears the parties intended to use them in a different sense.
10
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No such intention appears in this case as to
the use of the word 'fire'. That the wool, submerged for the time mentioned, became smok-ing hot, may be conceded; that spontaneous
combustion, caused by the wool being submerged in water, existed may also be conceded; and still the plaintiff has not shown any
direct loss by fire a's that word is used and
known to the public generally. Fire is always
caused by combustion, but combustion does
not always cause fire. The word 'spontaneous'
refers to the origin of that combustion. It
means the internal development of heat without the action ~c)f the external agent. 'Fire' is
defined in the Century Dictionary as 'the
visible heat or light evolved by the action of a
high temperature on certain bodies, which are
in consequence styled 'inflamable or combustible.' In Webster's Dictionary 'fire' is defined
as 'the evolution of light and heat in the combustion of bodies.' No definition of fire can be
found that does not include the idea of visible
heat or light, and this is also the popular
meaning given to the word."
See also Security Insurance Company vs. Choctaw
Cotton Oil Company, 299 P. 882, (Okla. 1931).
The court properly refused to accept mere evidence of charring and ashes, which were plain indications of combustion and heat as the equivalent
of fire.
This common sense meaning of "fire" within
the contemplation of fire policies, has been adopted
by those courts which have considered claims of
11
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coverage under a fire policy where the only evidence of "fire" was an overheated electric motor.
In the case of Saul J. B~aron Corp. vs. Piedmont
Fire Ins. Co., 1 N.Y.S. 2d 713, 166 Misc. 69 (1937),
the plaintiff brought an action in the New York
Court under a standard fire policy for damage resulting from an alleged fire. The defendant denied
the existance of a fire. In a Per Curiam decision
the ·court held:
"Plaintiff had the burden of showing its
alleged fire damage. The only evidence of the
cause of the alleged fire, charring, or burning
of electric wiring, was that of an overload of
electric current. The burning or charring of
a wire carrying electric current occurring
during or accompanying an overload of current, must be regarded as an electrical injury,
e'specially when, as here, there is an absence
of evidence showing such burning or charring
to be a fire, as distinguished, if it can be that,
from electrical injury."
The judgment warding recovery was reversed.
The same result was reached by the Pennsylvania Court in the case of Bass, et al vs. Security
Insur~ance Company of N ezv Haven, et al., 78 D. &
C. 26, (Pa. 1951). The defendants had issued fire
insurance policies to the plaintiff wherein property
of the plaintiff was insured against "direct loss by
fire". The issuance of the policies and the damage
were 'admitted, but the defendants denied the Io·ss
was a result of fire. The evidence indicated that when
12
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firemen arrived at the premises they found the
ground floor and the cellar of the building filled
with smoke. In the cellar they found an overheated
and smoldering electric motor. There was no visible
light or flame. v-r egetables, fruits and meats in the
premises were condemned by the health authorities,
and the plaintiff brought suit to recover his loss
occasioned thereby. The case turned on the meaning
of "fire" as contained in the policy. The following
is quoted from the opinion of the court:
" 'Fire' is a con1mon term. It is a rule
of reason, primarily in the interpretation and
construction of written contracts, fuat the
sense in which the terms are used is determined by the intent of the parties. The term
'fire', is not defined in these contracts, and
hence it is that the commonly understood
meaning is the criterion." (Citing cases)
After discussing several decisions from other
jurisdictions, the Court concluded:
"There was no fire as such term is used
in the policies and therefore no liability of
the insurers arose thereunder."
The mere presence of heat is to be distinguishe'd
from "fire" under a fire insurance policy. This distinction has been long recognized by the courts. The
Illinois Court, relying on substantial precedent in
the early case of Gibbons vs. German Insu~ance and
Savings Instit~ttion, 30 Ill. App. 263, 266 ( 1889),
held that damage caused by steam escaping from
13
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a break in the pipes of the heating apparatus by
which the rooms were heated, which produced such
a degree of heat th~at the furniture and books became charred, was not damage by "fire", within the
terms of an ordinary fire insurance policy. The
Court stated:
"The common understanding of the word
fire would never include heat, short of the degree of ignition, however produced."
The reasoning contained in the'se early cases
has found acceptance in the decisions of contemporary courts. In Spare vs. Glen Falls Insurance Company, 75 A. 64, 137 Conn. 105 (1950), an action
was filed on a fire policy claiming damage sustained by fire when an oil burning furnace became
overheated bec·ause of failure of a safety shut-off
device. The only fire involved was that which burned
within the combustion chamber of the furnace itself.
However, the heat be,came so intense as to cause
the outside finish to "disintegrate". The Court declared the fire, although excessive, to be a friendly
one and the damage not compensable.
'''When, however, a friendly fire escapes
from the agency employed to restrain it, an~d
damages property by igniting it or, while
still confined therein, causes a secondary fire
to Btart outside the agency, it becomes a hostile fire, and for loss 'So cause'd the insurer
must indemnify the owner. Accordingly, the
distinction is clearly drawn between a case
where, as here, damage results in consequence
14
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of excessive heat from fire confined as designed, with no external burning, and one
where such excessive heat kindles a secon·dary
fire.''
A similar result was reached in the case of First
Christi.an Chnfch vs. Hartford Mutunl Ins. Co., 276
S.W. 2d 502 (Tenn. 1954), where damage caused
by heat from an overheated boiler due to a faulty
stoker mechanism was held not compensable within
the terms of a fire policy. See also Consoli vs. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 84 A. 2d 926 (N. H., 1951),
to the same effect.
The testimony of the plaintiff's witness to the
effect that heat within the electric motor was generated to a degree sufficient to melt the copper wire
within the motor and ch·ar the insulation is not
evidence of a "fire". In the cases cited above there
was heat produced in the "agency" by a "friendly
fire" beyond that which was intended or expected,
but recovery was denied because no damage was done
beyond the agency itself. There is no evidence, and
such is not claimed, that the damage to plaintiffs'
plants resulted from "externallburning", or a "secondary fire" started outside the agency. 'Thus, even
were it conceded that the conversion of electric energy to heat energy under the circumstances of this
case, was a fire, there would be no basis for recovery
because it was confined to the motor where its use
15
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was contemplated, and burning did not occur beyond that '''agency".
In the instant case the motor became overheated
be,cause a short circuit, or a resistance which developed to the electrical current. This same principle finds useful application in an electric heating
coil where heat is produced by creating an intentional resistance to an electric current. U n'der all
the definitions of "fire", including the Lavitt case,
the element of '''combustion" is essential. A "fire",
"frien'dly" or "hostile", was not prolduced within the
electric motor because there was an absence of combustion. The heat produced from the electrical energy is not the '''effect of combustion", nor is it
the equivalent of "ignition or burning." The electrical
disturbance produced heat, but "heat is not fire".
There is a further reason why the plaintiff has
failed to bring his case within the coverage of the
policy. Electrical current, with accompanying heat
and light has long been held not to constitute "fire"
within the meaning of a fire policy.
In the case of Sleet vs. Farmers Mut1tal Fire
Ins. Co., 113 S.W. 515 (Ky. 1908), plaintiff's barn
was struck by lightning and destroyed, but was not
burned. Tlhe Ken~tucky court in denying the recovery
under a fire policy, stated:
"She was not entitled to recover for loss
16
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by lightning which did not burn, but merely
knocked down, the barn, anymore than she
would have been entitled to recover under
the policy if it had been blown down by a
windstorm."
Similarly, in the instant case the mere existence
of ·an electrical current with its associated heat and
light, was not the equivalent of "burning", and was
not a "fire", within the meaning of the policy. In
the very eal'ly case of Kenniston vs. The Mer. County
M~ttual Ins. Co., 14 N. H. Reports 34~ (1843), the
Court held that damage from lightning without
combustion was not within the terms of a fire insurance policy, although it recognized that h·ad the
fire occurred from lightning, that the !destruction
or the damage done would have been compensable.
In the instant case the electrical malfunction
could have resulted in a fire and damage, for which
recovery could have been m·ade. Such did not happen
and the mere occurrence of an electrical phenomenon
generating heat is not sufficient to bring it within
the coverage of the policy.
Under law and reason it is submitted that an
electrical short circuit in a motor producing internal
heat, as was testified to in this case, is not a "fire"
within the meaning of the insurance policy.
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ARGUMENT
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE PLAINTIF'FS' DAMAGE WAS A DIRECT AND
PROXIMATE RESULT OF THE ALLEGED FIRE.

Even were the trial court justified in finding
that a fire occurred in the electric motor, the damage which occurred to plaintiff's plants was not the
direct result thereof.
"The rule in fire insurance cases where liability arises for 'direct' loss is that the loss must
be connected by the relationship of cause and
effect with the fire (citing cases). In other
states, when the subject has received broader
discussion, 'direct' has been considered the
equivalent of 'immediate,' or 'approxim'ate',
as distinguished from 'remote' or incidental."
Sidehill Corporation vs. Glen Falls Insurance
Co., 183 No Y. 2d897 (1959).
The "fire" must be the efficient cause which
sets in motion the chain of events which immediately results in the damage. The evidence is undisputed in the present case that the motor ceased
operating because of bad bearings. This fact was
established by plaintiff's witnesses:
"It was the mechanical defect that was in the
motor that caused it to electrically burn out."
(R. 50)

Further testimony indicate·d that the worn
be·arings were a result of "every day wear ·and tear".
Th·ese bearings caused the motor to become over18
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loaded and reduce its normal speed. As the motor
turned more slowly, the electrical energy manifested
itself in the form of heat ( R. 58). The heat associated with a n1otor failure followed the mechanical
malfunction ( R. 59). The uncontradicted testimony
of the witnesses is that the mechanical failure was
the proximate and direct cause of the motor failure.
The facts affirm this fact more convincingly than
words. Following the "electrical burn-out" of the
first motor, the electrician installed a second standby motor. It also "burned out" because of the "drag"
occassioned by the worn bearings. It is submitted
that if a dozen more electrical motors had been
successively installed, each would have been "blown
out" just as the two did because the cause, namely,
the worn bearings, had not been eliminated.
The heat generated within the motor, which
the trial court has termed "fire", did not cause the
furnace to cease operation and the heat loss in the
greenhouse. The "fire", if any, was only ·a consequence of the mechanical malfunction, and the resulting "electrical blow-out" of the motors, was not
a cause, either direct or remote, of the heat failure.
The "fire" even as alleged by plaintiff occurred after
the motor stopped, and was in no way a proxim'ate
cause of the threatened freezing to the plants in the
greenhouse ( R. 60-61).
"The proximate cause of the fire within an
insurance policy is the efficient cause, the one
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that necessarily sets the other causes in motion." Port Washington National Bank &
Trust Company vs. The Hartford Fire Insur,ance Compar~y, 300 N. Y. Supp. 87 4, 2·53 App.
Div. 760.
The same principle was declared by the Missouri
court in different language. Where the peril specifically insured against sets other causes in motion,
which in an unbroken sequence and connection between the ·act and final injury, produces the final
results for which the insured seeks recovery under
the policy, then the peril insured against will be
regarded as the proximate cause. Dixie Pine Products Company vs. Maryland Casunlty, 100 S. W.
2d 2'3.
Mr. Hadley, plaintiffs' witness, affirmed that
a mechanical malfunction was the cause of the
damage:
"Q. Did you find what caused this
motor to burn?
A. It was a bad bearing deep in the
rotor shaft.
Q. It was a mechanical defect th~at was
in the motor that caused it to mechanically
burn out?
A. That is right." (R. 50).
It is submitted that the direct or proximate
cause of plaintiffs' loss was a mechanical failure in
the motor and furnace mechanism which set in motion an unbroken sequence of events resulting in his
damage.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I'll.
RECOVERY FOR DAMAGE RESULTING FROM
AN ELECTRICAL INJURY OR DISTURBANCE IS SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDED UNDER THE TERMS ·OF THE
POLICY.

The insurance policy, un·der the Farm, Ranch
and Orchard Endorsement, Paragraph 14, contains
the following· provisions:
"14. Electrical Apparatus Clause: If electrical appliances or devices (including wiring)
are covered under this policy, this company
shall not be liable for an electrical injury or
disturbance to the said electrical appliances
or devices (including wiring) caused 'by electrical currents artificially generated unless
fire ensues, and if fire does ensue, this company shall be liable only for its proportion of
loss caused by such ensuing fire."
This paragraph specifically excludes coverage
for any loss or damages resulting from an "electrical injury or disturbance to electrical ... devices
caused by electrical currents'' unless fire ensues.
In the event fire does ensue the company has limited
its liability to the proportion of loss caused by the
fire. Argument and authority presented under
Point I, infra., affirms that a "fire" did not ensue.
Even were it determined that the electrical blow-out
of the motor was a fire, the company's liability is
restricted to that portion of the damage directly
resulting from the fire. No proof was presented or
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attempted by plaintiff concerning this. Further,
since "electrical injury or disturbance" is excluded
from .coverage, any damage proximately resulting
therefrom is also excluded.
There is ·a complete absence of evidence in the
record to show the cost of repair of the damage done
by ''fire" in the motor. Similarly, there is no evidence whereby the court could find that any fire
damage resulted. The repair invoice indicates that
the damages to the motors were mechanical in nature. The repair included rewinding of the motor
armatures, replacement of bad b e a r i n g s and
straightening a bent shaft, all as more fully appears
in plaintiff's Exhibit 4. Electrical exemption clauses
on fire policies similar to the one contained in the
policy under consideration have been consistently
enforced by the courts. See U. S. Fire Insurance
Company vs. Universal Broadcasting Corporation,
168 S.W. 2d, 191 (Ark. 1'943).
ARGUMEN'T
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING
PLAINTIFF AN AMOUNT IN EXCESS OF THE POLICY
LIMITS.

The insurance policy, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1, indicates that the " . . . policy covers the following
described property ... ''$5,000.00 on plants and bulbs
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in greenhouse.'' Coverage is specifically limited to
those items in the amount indicated.
The judgment entered by the court granted recovery for damage to plants and bulbs in the amount
of $5,000.00, damage to the oil burning unit including the motor in the sum of $190.20 and $32.72 for
purchase of fuel and rental of space heat equipment,
or a total of $5,222.92, to which interest in the
amount of $255.46 was added for a total of $5478.38.
As observed, defendant's liability under the
policy was limited to $5,000.00. The court permitted
a recovery of $5222.92, or $222.92 in excess of the
limits of its li'ability. Applicable interest on the
excess was also wrongfully included in the judgment.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the law and evidence it is submitted
that:
1. A "fire" did not occur on plaintiff's premises as alleged.
2. Even were it determined that a "fire" did
ensue, the plaintiffs' damage was not the direct
result thereof.
3. Plaintiffs' damage was the direct ,and proximate result of a mechanical failure which was not
insured against.
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4. Any damage resulting from electrical injury, as disturbance w·as specifically excluded from
coverage under the policy, and
5. In any event, defendant's liability is limited to $5,000.00 as stated in the policy.
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON, & BALDWIN
an·d MERLIN R. LYBBERT
BY--------------------------------------------------------

Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
515 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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